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Regulatory activity  to maintain the  status of the  prevent  sales  of  milk  at  "unreasonably  low"  price
independent  milk  company  as  a  viable  competitive  levels  [15].
force  in the  milk industry has been a central focus of  Beginning  in  the  early  1960's, the  FTC ordered
regulatory  policy  since  the  1930's.  Some  authorities  and stringently  enforced prohibitions against the four
question  the  degree  of  emphasis  on  preservation  largest  dairy  companies  -- Beatrice,  Borden, Kraftco,
under  the  law,  but  most  feel  that  there  is  an  and Foremost -- and one medium size concern  - Dean
important  element  of  protection  embodied  in  Foods  - from  acquiring  any  other  milk  company
regulatory activity affecting the industry. We feel that  without prior FTC approval.  These orders had as their
this aspect  of the law is important and is the focus of  primary  goals  stemming  the  absorption  of
this article.  independent  milk  companies  by  the  largest  firms  in
Legal  protection  of  the  independent  dairy  is  the  industry,  preventing  further  increases  in market
afforded  from  three  sources.  The  Robinson-Patman  concentration,  channeling  merger  activity  toward
Act,  which  prohibits  firms  from  discriminating  in  smaller  firms,  and  forcing  larger  firms  to  expand
price  where  the  effect may be to  substantially lessen  internally  [4,  p. 16,  17, 18].  These  merger guidelines,
competition,  has  been  enforced  extensively  by the  of  course,  also  had  a  direct  effect  on  the  merger
Federal  Trade  Commission  (FTC)  on  behalf  of  activity of all other major dairies.
independent  milk  companies.  For  example,  of  53  With  the  expiration  of  the  10-year  merger
complaints  filed by the  FTC from June 1950 to June  prohibitions,  the FTC in June 1973 announced  a new
1964,  nine  were  against  dairy  companies  [21,  p.  enforcement  policy  with  respect  to  mergers  in  the
176].  Independent  firms  have  protected  their  own  dairy  industry  [11].  The new  policy marks a  radical
position  under  the  law  in  treble  damage  private  departure  from  the  old  in  that  the  Commission
litigation.  As a  group, the  national and regional dairy  attempts  to  define  suspect  mergers  in  terms  of
concerns  have  been  involved  in  almost  continuous  aggregate  size,  market delineation, and market shares.
treble  damage  litigation on  charges  of discriminatory  Detailed  analysis  of the potential impact  of the new
pricing in recent years.  guidelines  on  specific  markets  is  needed  to  assess
In  1970,  the  dairy  industry  in  34  states  have  what  changes, if any, the policy  may have on merger
secured  for  its  own  "benefit"  special  state  laws  activity.  It  is  significant  to  note,  however,  that an
prohibiting  price  discrimination  and/or  sales  below  underlying  basis  of  the  new  policy  is  that,  "The
cost,  or  state  milk  control  laws  fixing  resale  milk  preservation  of  [a  strong  middle-tier]  of  viable
prices  [14].  The  main advocates  of such  laws  have  independent  companies  is  as  essential  to  the
been  the independent  segment of the  industry. They  competitive  health  of  the  dairy  industry  today  as
were  enacted  largely for  independents'  protection to  when  the  Commission  cited  it  in  its  finding  in
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23Beatrice  Foods  . . ." Thus,  it  appears that the policy  malady sought to be remedied. 
toward  horizontal  mergers  may  be  perpetuated  A recently  completed study at Purdue University
despite the inclusion of local market guidelines,  provides  insight  into  each  of  these  aspects  with
implications  for  contemporary  regulatory  policy  in
REQUIREMENTS FOR AN  EFFECTIVE POLICY  the  fluid  milk  industry  [14].  The  main objective  of
DESIGNED TO PRESERVE A PARTICULAR  the  study  was  to  determine  the  economic  status  of
INDUSTRY~  SECTOR  the  independent  milk  company  in  today's  milk
industry  - and  coincidentally  after  over  20 years  of
protective treatment  under state and federal statutes.
The  question  addressed  here  is  to  the The  study  involved  20  independent  dairy
appropriateness  and effectiveness  of policies designed  i  i  companies.  This  sample  was  selected  because  these
to protect  a  certain  industry sector.  The relevance of  cpated  a  epemet same firms  had participated in a  1965  experiment  at
this  question  for the  milk industry  owes to two  key  P  e,  s  afrding  a  uniqe  data  bae 
points.  First,  current  policy  has impeded  reasonable  o  arion  trong  or purposes  of  comparison  [12].  A  strong  rapport
adjustment  of  industry  capacity  to  market  sales.  c  between  case  firms  and  the  institution  permitted
Second,  current  policy may  have tended to  suppress  access  to information  often withheld  from university
competition in the industry rather than enhance  it.  researchers.  It  is  not  claimed  that  the  sample  was researchers.  It  is  not  claimed  that  the  sample  was
This article  does not challenge the soundness of a representative  of  the  independent  sector.  On  the
policy  designed  to  stem  the  tide  toward  increasing  contrary,  case  firms were a good deal larger and more
market  concentration.  Such  policy,  along with  laws  progressive  than the  average  independent  processor.
designed  to  prevent  collusive  and  truly  predatory  The  20  sample  firms,  five  of which  processed
market  activity, is presumed to be an essential part of  milk in  more  than one facility, had plants located in
preserving a competitive  market economy.  six  midwestern  and  southeastern  states.  Their
The  rationale  of  regulatory  policy  designed  to  products  were distributed  collectively  in eight  states.
maintain  the  competitive  status  of  a  particular maintain  the  competitive  status  of  a  particular  Sales  of the  case  firms averaged about  $8 million in
segment  of an industry  is based on three assumptions  1  ,  ra  from  a  million  to  or 
about  the  relation  of  protection  to  effective  million  million annually.
competition:
1.  It  assumes  that  the  protected  sector  is
operationally  (technically) efficient. Without  OPERATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF THE
operational  efficiency  in  the  independent  INDEPENDENT SECTOR
sector,  the  long  term  merits  of  a  policy
designed  to  protect  the  status  of the  sector  Efficiency  in  processing  in  the  fluid  milk
can, in general, be questioned.  industry is  to  a  large  extent  a function  of economies
2.  It assumes that the protected  sector provides  of  size.  Other  major  factors  influencing  processing
an  active  source  of  competition for  the  costs  are  utilization  of  plant  capacity,  degree  of
remainder of the  industry.  The  ability  to  specialization, and managementability.
actively  compete in the short  run may result  Studies of economies  of scale  in milk  processing
from  operational  efficiency,  willingness  on  have  been  extensive  [6, 7,  9,  17, 29]. They  indicate
the  part  of ownership  and  management  to  that  milk processing costs  decline continuously  but at
accept  lower  returns  on either management  a decreasing rate as plant size increases to a volume of
or  investment,  or living  off depreciation.  In  800,000  quarts  per day.  Beyond  100,000  quarts per
the  long  run,  only  operational  efficiency  day the fall in per unit costs slows considerably.
provides  the  basis  for (but does  not assure)  A  conservative  75,000  quarts  per  day  was
an active source of competition.  selected  as a  norm for minimally  efficient  plant  size.
3.  It assumes an absence of adverse  external  Based  on this  norm,  one-half of the case  firms  were
effects  on other sectors of the market.  If a  operating  plants  of insufficient  size  to generate  scale
policy  either impedes  the ability  of another  economies  in  milk  processing.  But  because  the  case
sector  to  achieve  operational  efficiency  or  firms  were  larger  and  more progressive  than  typical
effectively  limits  its  pricing  strategy  independents,  this drastically understates the national
alternatives,  the  policy  may  have  more  picture. Data from a 1965 USDA study indicated that
undesirable  long term consequences than the  in  85  markets  encompassing  more  than half of the
1  This  is not to suggest  that particular  firms in the sector might not  be operationally efficient  and merit protection.  Nor
is  it  to imply that  short-term  policies designed to provide an orderly transition to the new equilibrium structure are unwarranted.
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Figure 1.LABOR  PRODUCTIVITY  CURVES  FOR  FOUR  MODEL  PLANTS  AND  15  INDEPENDENT
DAIRIES.
milk  plants  in the  country,  over  90  percent  of the  total processing  costs in a  modern  100,000 quart per
independently  owned  plants  were  below  this  day plant  [9, p. 9-10].
minimally  efficient  size  [16].  In  comparison,  only
about  one-fourth  of  the  plants  of  national  and  Figure  1  shows  the  labor  productivity  curve
regional  dairies  were  below  this level of production.  estimated  for  the  15  independents  furnishing
In  even  sharper  contrast,  in  November  1969,  18  sufficient data for this analysis, and the curve for four
plants  of  the  six  largest  vertically  integrated  chain  model plants with a comparable  degree of automation
stores  processed  an average of nearly  200,000 quarts  [29].  The  results  indicate  the  labor  efficiency  of
per day.  independents within given size  categories is below the
Actual processing  cost  figures were  not gathered  normssetbyeconomicengineeringstudies.
from the  case  firms because  of reticence in discussing  Of  course  it  is  unrealistic  to  suggest  that  a real
costs, lack of data, and incompatibility of accounting  life  plant  could  operate  as  efficiently  as  the  model
systems.  Instead  data  were  gathered  on  labor  plants.  But  the  magnitude of difference  between  the
productivity.  Plant labor costs probably represent the  curves  is  substantial.  For  example,  based  on  these
most  crucial  controllable  cost  category  in  milk  data,  a  50,000  quart independent  could  save around
processing2 - accounting  for  almost  25  percent  of  $30,000 per  year by improving  labor  productivity to
2Carton  costs represent  about 40 percent  of total costs, excluding raw product  cost,  in a 100,000 quart plant, but these
are much  more easily controllable  than labor costs and  increase in almost  direct proportion  to plant size.
3 The hypothesis  that  the  "b" coefficients  were identical  could not be rejected  at the 5 percent  level of significance  (t =
.855,  15  d.f.).  The intercepts were  tested  by aggregating  the data and using a 0-1 dummy variable for case  firm and model plant
observations  respectively.  The  coefficient  for the dummy  variable was significantly  greater  than  zero  at the  95  percent  level  of
confidence (t =  1.851, 17 d.f.).
25the  norm.4 This  $30,000  cost  differential  were  very  conservative.  Several  firms  consciously
approximates  the  average  after-tax  profits of similar  priced  a  few  cents  higher  than  direct  competitors.
sized  case  firms.  The  lower  labor productivity  of the  Dominant  firm  price leadership,  both tacit and overt,
independents  stems  primarily from a  proliferation of  by major  dairy companies  and integrated  chain  store
product  lines.5 The  average  case  firm  handled  133  processors was the  price  coordinating  mechanism  for
product  identifications.  Large  multi-plant  firms  the  markets  served  by  14  of the  20  firms  studied.
control  the  costs  of product  proliferation  by  plant  Most  case  firms willingly went along with this market
specialization.  Independent  concerns  could  mechanism.
accomplish  similar  savings  by  joint  processing  Even  in  situations  when independents  would
agreements  with other independents or even national  be expected to be most agressive - after loss of a large
or regional concerns. However, independent  managers  account  - they tended to react conservatively.  Eleven
were  reluctant  to  utilize other  processors  as  a major  of the  case firms had  suffered  recent  loss of a  major
source of supply.  account,  which meant volume losses ranging up to 40
Analysis  of  the  distribution  systems  of  percent  of total sales  volume.  Only  three  firms had
independents  revealed that the  case firms were  more  priced  more  aggressively  in  an  effort  to  recoup  this
heavily  dependent  on  low-volume,  high-cost  lost  volume.  The  others  tended  to  take  losses
distribution  channels  such as small grocery stores and  passively  or  engage  in internal defensive measures.  As
home  deliveries than were the major dairy companies.  one  manager  said,  "We  were  philosophical  about it.
For  example,  23  percent  of the  average  case  firm's  We didn't want to start anything."
volume  was  delivered  to the consumer's doorstep.  Vatter  traced  such an  inactive  role by the  fringe
Another  22  percent  was  sold  to  vendors,  most  of  to  fear  of  retaliation  by the  dominant  firms  in  a
which  was distributed  on home delivery  routes.  This  market  [28].  For  the  case  firms,  however,  there
may  be  a  rational  strategy  on  behalf  of  the  appeared  to  be  five  factors  which  influenced
independent.  But the  problem  is not only that  such  reluctance to price aggressively:
sales  are  characterized  by high costs; these segments  1.  Lack of accurate  cost data  on which to base
of the market  are  shrinking, leaving  the independent  bids relative to major dairy companies.
in  a  tenuous  position  to  grow  or  even  maintain  2.  No distinction between average and marginal
volume.  cost.
Only  four  of the  20  firms  had  trade  areas  in  3.  Inability  to bid for large accounts because  of
excess of 100 miles,  while  six distributed within a 50  high costs and/or limited trade area.
to  70 mile  radius.  The remaining firms confined their  4.  The assumption of a high propensity to react
operations  to a small area surrounding their plant. An  by competitors  - probably too high in many
analysis  of the effect  of marginal  increases  in  firms'  instances.
distribution  areas  revealed  that  half  of  the  5.  Moral aversion to price "cutting."
independents  could  reduce  average  total  costs  by  There  are,  of  course,  other  facets  of  rivalry
market  expansion  even on relatively  high cost,  small  besides  price  in  oligopolistic  milk  markets.  For
truck distribution  routes.  If distribution of the added  example,  advertising  and product  development  could
volume  was  transportable  on  trailer trucks, all  firms  offset pricing disadvantages.
analyzed could have reduced average total costs.  Advertising,  however,  was  becoming  less
important  as  a  competitive  weapon  by  the
independents  studied.  Average  advertising
COMPETITIVE BEHAVIOR  OF THE  expenditures by the  case  firms had declined from 1.2
INDEPENDENT  percent of sales in 1965 to 0.8 percent in 1969. Thus,
the  case  firms  seemed  to  recognize  the  increasing
Disruptive  pricing  by  independents  has  been  difficulty  of  gaining  brand  name  product
ascribed  an  important  role  in  thwarting joint  profit  differentiation for one of the most homogenous food
maximization  strategies  by  the  "core"  of dominant  products in the marketplace today.
firms  [28].  Whether  this  is  the  case  in  the  dairy  It  was  hypothesized  that  independents,  with
industry  today  is questionable  based  on this  study.  their  greater  managerial  flexibility,  might be  able to
Case firms were reluctant to "shake-up"  a market.  skip  several traditional stages of product development
Pricing policies  of all but  six  sample  companies  and  be  the  first  to  introduce  new  products  in their
4 Based on a conservative  $3  per hour average  plant wage rate.
5Another  contributing factor was excessive  day-to-day  fluctuation in production runs by  the  case  firms.
26local  markets.  This hypothesis  was confirmed  by the  [2,  22,  24].  All  sample firms showed  positive growth
independent  managers  interviewed.  Of  the  94  rates  (as  measured  in  yearly  dollar  sales)  over  the
instances  of  new  product  introduction  in  the  case  decade,  1959-1969.  Average  compound  rate  of
firms'  markets  since  1965,  38  percent  were  by  growth in  sales  were 5.6 percent  yearly. Deflated for
independents.  But  the  new  products  that  price changes,  the true rate of growth was about two
independents  introduced  were  most  often  judged  percent  annually  over  the  past  five  years.  National
"failures"  or  "questionable."  Examples  included  and regional firms grew  twice as fast as the case firms
imitation and filled  milks, and home bulk dispensers.  during  this  period - but  it is  important  to note that
On the  other hand, new product introductions by the  most  of their  growth  stemmed  from  non-dairy  and
majors  such  a  yogurt,  low  fat  milk  and  individual  even non-food items  [20, p. 104-107].
creamers  were  judged  unqualified  successes.  Thus,  Most  sales  increases  of  the  case  firms  were
while  major  firms tended  to obtain  a  successful  new  accounted  for by acquisitions  of smaller  dairies.  The
niche  in  the  market  by  innovation,  independents  20  case firms had  acquired a  total of 69 dairies  since
more often incurred losses in attempting to introduce  1959.  Acquisitions  accounted  for  all growth in  sales
new products.  for  six firms between  1959  and  1969.  That  is, in the
absence  of acquisitions  of smaller dairies, they would
FINANCIAL CONDITION AND GROWTH  have  been  stagnant  or  would  have  actually  suffered
declines  in  sales.  To  illustrate  the  importance  of
Data  on  profits  gathered  from  case  firms  and  acquisitions  to growth, during  1965-1969,  seven case
several  secondary  sources  led  to  the  following  firms  grew  at  a  compound  rate  in  excess  of  10
conclusions:  1. Case  firms were  comparable  in  profit  percent.  These  seven  accounted  for  23  of  the  30
performance  to other  similar-sized  independents, and  acquisitions  during the span.  On the other hand, four
were  considerably  above  the  average  for  all  firms  showed  no  growth  or  lost  sales  during  this
independents.  2.  In  none of three  key  measures  of  period.  None  of these  firms  had purchased  smaller
profit  performance6 did  the  case  firms  or  dairies.
independents  generally  compare  favorably  with  Eighteen  of  the  case  firms  were  closely  held
national  or  regional  dairy  companies.  3.  Profits  for  corporations  and  two  were  operating  cooperatives.
the  industry  as  a  whole  trended  sharply  downward  For most of the  closely held firms, family ownership
between  1965  and 1970  [12,  13, 14,20].  For 1969,  had  a  pervasive  influence  on virtually  all  aspects  of
case firms furnishing  an income  statement averaged  a  firm  organization  and  behavior.  Aversion  to  debt,
return  of 0.9  percent  on  sales  and  2.7  percent  on  constrained  and  conflicting  goals,  and  conservative
total  assets  after  taxes.  In  contrast,  10 major  dairies  competitive  attitudes  were  characteristics  exhibited
averaged  2.2 percent on sales and 5.2 percent on total  by most case firms which appeared directly related to
assets.  family domination.  When  management  expressed  the
Analysis  of the financial statements of case firms  desire  to  expand  - even  at the  risks  of added  debt
generally  revealed  sound  equity positions.  Six of the  load  and  competitive  reaction  - ownership  often
case  firms  had  no  long  term  debt  at  all.  This  vetoed  any such  move.7 The owners' attitude seemed
conservative  financial  attitude  gives  independents  a  often  to  be,  "Don't  risk  the  family  fortune,"  even
reservoir  of strength in case  of hard times. However,  though  family  assets  may have been  largely attained
it also  was symptomatic  of a  risk aversion preference  from the milk industry in its heyday.
that  left  many  case  firms  in  the  position  of being
unable  to  generate  internal  financing  for
modernization,  plant  expansion,  and  acquisitions-  EXTERNALEFFECTS  ONOTHERSECTORS
but extremely  reluctant  or unwilling to borrow funds  AND IMPLICATIONS
for these purposes.
Technological  change  and  shifts  in  the  buyer  Three  facets  of  external  effects  are  relevant  to
market  have  created  strong  pressures  for  smaller  this  inquiry.  First,  the  independent  sector may be a
dairies  to  grow  rapidly  in  order  to  remain  effective  source  of  competitive  stimulus  for  other  sectors  in
competitors.  Several  theorists  have  postulated  that  the industry.
growth of any firm  is a  key measure of performance  The  study  has  indicated  that  in  spite  of
6 The three ratios were net  income  to sales,  net income  to net worth, and net income  to total assets.
7  In some  cases  this conflict  was  evident  even when ownership and management  were vested,  for practical purposes, in
the same person.
27protective  policies, the independent  sector continues  Contemporary  structural  and  competitive
to  be  plagued  by  efficiency  and  management  conditions  in  the  milk  industry  require  careful
problems.  In  addition,  its contribution  to the market  consideration  of the  proper  standard for  finding the
as  a  viable  source  of  competition  has  been  requisite  competitive  injury  under  both  state  and
questioned.  federal  discrimination  statutes lest  competition  at all
These findings raise doubts concerning the extent  market  levels  be  discouraged.  Traditional  standards
to which the independent  sector acts as a competitive  such  as  diversion  of  business,  intense  competition,
pacemaker  for  other  sectors  of the  industry.  While  downward  price  pressure,  and  even  sales below  cost
certain  independents  do  act  as  viable  sources  of  [3,  27]  may  have  little  predatory  significance  in  an
competition  for their  individual markets  and  deserve  industry  where  adjustment  of  capacity  to  market
regulatory  protection  from  predation,  generalization  sales  and  a  new effective  source of competition, the
of this behavior  to the  independent sector as a whole  integrated.  chain  grocery,  stand  as  important threats
is unwarranted.  to  the  remainder  of the  industry  - nationals  and
Second,  the regulations  designed  to preserve  the  regionals as well as independents.
independent  sector as a viable  competitive force, may  Third,  the impact  of regulations which suppress
themselves  be  having  an  adverse  impact  on  the  competition  upon  the structure  of  the  industry  has
competitive behavior of other sectors.  already  been  demonstrated.  As  early  as  1963,  Clark
The  Robinson-Patman  Act,  as  well  as  the  state  warned  of  incentives  created  by  state  milk  control
unfair trade practice  laws, prohibits only instances of  laws  for  vertical  integration  by  chain  stores thereby
price  discrimination  having  the  prescribed  adverse  distorting  the  structure  of  the  milk  industry  from
effect  on  competition.  While  a  decline  in  that  which  would  have  existed  under  competitive
Robinson-Patman  litigation  by  the  FTC  appears  to  pricing  [5,  p.  26].  Today  more  than  30  percent  of
have  occurred  in  recent  years, private  treble  damage  California's  milk  processing  capacity  is  vertically
Robinson-Patman  litigation  remains  plentiful.  In the  integrated.  This  compares  with  11.4  percent for  the
opinion of many, jury findings of competitive  injury  nation  as  a  whole  in  November  1969.  Significant
and  awards  of  substantial  damages  to  independent  further  shifts in market  shares  from the conventional
concerns  seem to have been based on meager evidence  sector  to  the  integrated  chain  dairy  sector  are  in
of  injury  to  the  plaintiff  and little  or  no  injury  to  prospect  unless  adjustment  of  industry capacity  to
competition  in the economic sense.  The Utah Pie case  industry sales  and  more  intensive  price  competition
provides  an  excellent  illustration  [27].  In  this  case,  are  achieved.  In order for such adjustments  to occur
the  Supreme  Court  upheld  a  jury  finding  of  it  is  suggested:  1.  That  price  discrimination laws  be
competitive  injury  despite  the  fact  that  the  interpreted  more  liberally,  2.  that  legal  barriers  to
independent  Utah  Pie  Company  initially  possessed  mergers  be  lowered,  and  3.  that  state  milk  control
66.5  percent  of the  relevant  market;  experienced  a  and dairy  industry  unfair  trade  practice  laws  at the
steady increase  in sales; and improved its profits and  resale level be abandoned or modified.
financial  condition  throughout  a  four-year  period of  This  study  indicates  that  at  least  half  and
geographic  price  discrimination  by  national  food  probably  three-fourths of the case firms, and a higher
processors.  The  only  tangible  evidence  of injury  to  proportion of all independents could cease operations
the independent was a decline in market share to 45.3  over the next few years with no obvious deterioration
percent of frozen pie sales.  of  market  competition.  Indeed,  an  increase  in  the
In  retrospect,  for  the  national  concerns  to have  technical efficiency of the industry would result, even
penetrated  the  markets  and  avoided  the  geographic  if  this  means  allowing  independents  to  be  absorbed
price  discrimination  charge,  they  would  have  been  by  the  major  dairies.  Improved  stature  of the major
required  to  lower  their  price  structure  in  all  U.  S.  dairy  companies  might  well prove  valuable  in future
markets  where  they  sell  pies.  Such  suits  and  confrontations  with the  growing power of the rising
interpretations  have  acted  as  a  direct  deterrent  to  force  in the  industry  - the vertically  integrated chain
internal  penetration  by  national  and  regional  firms  grocery.  Also,  some  contend  that  growth  of  major
desiring to  expand their  market sales. The effect is to  dairies  will  give  countervailing  power  to  offset  the
make  prices  more  rigid, provide the  smaller  concerns  recent  shift  toward  bargaining  strength  of regional
with an umbrella for  inefficiency,  and stifle  the kind  producer associations.
of  competition  the  antitrust  laws  were  designed  to  The  point  is  this.  When  the  stated  purpose  of
instill.  regulatory  policy is to  encourage  competition,  a firm
8Which under the Sherman Act  standards could  have  been  considered  to  be monopolistically  controlled  [261.
28that  is  not  competing,  whether  large  or  small,  does  make  it  an  effective  competitor.  For  example,  a
not deserve  special protection from  its rivals. And no  feasible  alternative  which  should  receive
firm  should  be  insulated  from  the  competitive  consideration  is the establishment  of a program in an
environment  itself.  The  milk  industry  experience  agency  such as the Small  Business  Administration  to
demonstrates  in  some ways  the  effects of failure of  provide  managerial, technical,  and financial assistance
laws and legal interpretations to take this view. In this  to  independent  firms.  Other  programs  which  use
sense  it is  but a  case in point. But the issue is crucial.  direct  improvement  of  this  segment  rather  than
If the  public, because  of the  sheer magnitude  of  restriction  of  its  competitors  merit  consideration.
physical  and  human  capital  invested  in  the  University  Extension  programs  also  have  an
independent  sector,  deems it  desirable  to protect this  important  role  to  play  in  providing  educational
institution,  the  nature  of  such  protective  policy  assistance  to the independent  sector and the industry
should  be  radically  changed.  The  emphasis  must  be  as a whole.
on  improved  economic  efficiency  of  this  sector  to
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